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ABSTRACT
The share of finance in U.S. GDP has been multiplied by more than three over the postwar period.
I argue, using evidence and theory, that corporate finance is a key factor behind this evolution. Inside
the finance industry, credit intermediation and corporate finance are more important than globalization,
increased trading, or the development of mutual funds for explaining the trend. In the non financial
sector, firms with low cash flows account for a growing share of total investment. I build a simple
equilibrium model to capture these salient features and I use it to interpret the data. I find that corporate
demand is the main contributor to the growth of the finance industry, but also that efficiency gains
in finance have been important to limit credit rationing. Overall, the model can account for a bit more
than half of the financial sector's growth.
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and NBER
tphilipp@stern.nyu.eduIn 1947, the ﬁnancial sector accounted for 2.32% of U.S. GDP and 2.76% of employee
compensation. In 2005, these fractions were 7.69% and 7.65%, respectively. Why is there
an upward trend in the size of the ﬁnancial sector? Why is the U.S. devoting a growing
share of its human capital to the provision of ﬁnancial services? What are the economic
forces than pin down the equilibrium size of the ﬁnancial sector? I attempt to answer these
questions using theory and evidence.
Understanding the evolution of the ﬁnancial sector is important for several reasons.
First, ﬁnance, unlike the rest of the service sector, would not exist in an Arrow-Debreu
economy. If markets were complete, the ﬁnance industry would be trivial. How then should
we interpret the dramatic growth of this industry over the past 60 years? Does this imply
that the U.S. economy has drifted away from the Arrow-Debreu benchmark? Is information
becoming more asymmetric, or enforcement more diﬃcult? Second, the fact, documented in
Goldin and Katz (2008) and Philippon and Resheﬀ (2007), that ﬁnance attracts a growing
share of the economy’s human capital prompts the question of the eﬃciency of this alloca-
tion. An analysis of the equilibrium size of ﬁnance is needed before we can hope to answer
this question. Finally, an explanation of the ﬁnancial sector’s growth requires a speciﬁc
model, because the mechanisms emphasized in the literature on structural change are not
relevant for many ﬁnancial services, especially the ones oﬀered to corporations.1
Before studying the role of corporate ﬁnance, I start by considering some alternate
explanations, and ﬁnd that they are not satisfactory. While ﬁnancial globalization might
seem like a plausible explanation, it doe sn o ta c c o u n tf o rt h ei n c r e a s i n gs i z eo fﬁnance. The
U.S., unlike the U.K., is not a large exporter of ﬁnancial services, and ﬁnancial globalization
is a relatively recent phenomenon, whereas the growth of ﬁnance has been continuous over
the post-war period. Moreover, the growth of the ﬁnancial sector does not simply correspond
to a growing number of traders. In fact, credit intermediation is still the largest contributor
to ﬁnancial value added. Finally, explanations based on diﬀerent trends in total factor
productivity (TFP) are not very promising, because labor-saving technological progress has
often contributed negatively to the size of the ﬁnancial sector.2 In addition, the value added
1See Baumol (1967). Financial services, unlike health care for instance, do not enter preferences directly.
Similarly, on the corporate side, they do not aﬀect production directly. Financial services only facilitate
production or consumption.
2Philippon and Resheﬀ (2007), for instance, document a steep decline in the number of bank clerks.
2of many ﬁnancial services depends directly on the productivity of industrial ﬁrms, so that,
in theory, technological progress in the industrial sector leads to balanced growth with a
constant relative size for the ﬁnance industry. This is indeed the case in the model presented
below. What other factors could explain the increasing size of ﬁnancial sector?
I argue that corporate ﬁnance is an important factor in the evolution of the ﬁnancial
sector. I present new evidence on the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of cash
ﬂows and investment expenditures. I ﬁnd that ﬁrms with low cash ﬂows account for a
growing share of total investment. In the 1950s, most corporate investment was done by
ﬁrms with high cash ﬂows. In 2000, half of total investment was done by ﬁrms whose cash
ﬂows covered less than a third of their capital expenditures. This evolution is consistent with
an increasing demand for ﬁnancial intermediation. It mighta l s o ,h o w e v e r ,b eac o n s e q u e n c e
of improvements in ﬁnancial intermediation, i.e., a supply shift. In addition, one would like
to understand how these evolutions relate to the amount of outstanding corporate liabilities,
to credit rationing, and to aggregate investment itself. A good understanding of these issues
requires an equilibrium model.
A simple model of a production economy with ﬁnancing constraints, endogenous moni-
toring and career choices is therefore developed to interpret the evidence. The model econ-
omy is populated by overlapping generations of agents who choose to work in the ﬁnancial
or in the non-ﬁnancial sector. Agents in the non-ﬁnancial sector have diﬀerent productiv-
ities and receive diﬀerent investment opportunities. Moral hazard limits borrowing, and
agents with good opportunities but low current cash ﬂows cannot always invest. Agents in
the ﬁnancial sector improve enforcement and relax borrowing constraints. In equilibrium,
agents must be indiﬀerent between careers in the ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial sectors, and
the market for corporate ﬁnancial services must clear.
Theoretically, the joint distribution of productivity and investment opportunities is a
fundamental determinant of the aggregate demand for ﬁnancial services. The intuition is
that, when ﬁrms with investment opportunities also receive high cash ﬂows, there is little
demand for intermediation, even if moral hazard is severe. On the other hand, eﬃciency
gains in ﬁnance have ambiguous consequences for the size of the ﬁnancial sector. When the
ﬁnancial sector is ineﬃcient, eﬃciency gains increase its size, but when it is already quite
eﬃcient, further gains reduce its size.
3I propose a quantitative interpretation of the growth of the U.S. ﬁnancial sector since
the 1950s. Using only data from the non ﬁnancial sector, I use the model to predict the
evolution of the ﬁnancial sector. The model uses information from the aggregate investment
to GDP ratio, and the joint distribution of cash ﬂows and investments, in order to recover
the deep parameters of the economy, and to generate quantitative predictions. The model
correctly predicts the evolution of outstanding credit market instruments, and accounts for
one half to two third of the increase in the GDP share of the ﬁnancial sector. When I
break down the evolution of supply and demand, I ﬁnd that demand for corporate ﬁnancial
services is the main contributor to the increase in size, and that eﬃciency gains in ﬁnance
were crucial to limit credit rationing.
The main contributions of the paper are to present new evidence, to provide a model
to interpret this evidence, and to analyze the evolution of the U.S. ﬁnancial sector. The
evidence includes the share of investment by low cash ﬁrms, the distinction between value
added and assets under management, and the functional analysis (advocated by Merton
(1995)) of the tasks performed in the ﬁnance industry. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the ﬁrst to propose an interpretation of the growth of the ﬁnancial sector over the
post-war period.
The paper is related to the literature on ﬁnancial intermediation, reviewed in Gorton and
Winton (2003). Following Diamond (1984) and Holmström and Tirole (1997), among others,
I focus on corporate ﬁnance and monitoring in the presence of moral hazard. My choice is
motivated by the evidence discussed in Section 1, and by the argument of Freixas and Rochet
(1997) that “the progress experienced recently in telecommunications and computers implies
that FIs would be bound to disappear if another, more fundamental, form of transaction
costs were not present.”
By trying to estimate quantitatively the importance of corporate ﬁnance frictions, this
paper is related to the work of Biais, Bisière, and Décamps (2000) and Hennessy and Whited
(2007). Using ﬁrm level data and theoretical models, they provide structural estimates of
the severity of moral hazard, and of the costs of external ﬁnance. This paper estimates the
macroeconomic equivalent of these costs. The macro and micro estimates are compared
in Section 4. In general equilibrium, however, the price of external ﬁnance is endogenous,
because it is always possible, though not always optimal, to increase the number of agents
4working in the ﬁnancial sector.
The paper is also related to the literature on ﬁnancial development: Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), King and Levine (1993), Do and Levchenko
(2007) and Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2007) among others. Do and Levchenko (2007),
in particular, ﬁnd that ﬁnancial development responds to the demand for external ﬁnance
generated by international trade. In this paper, I estimate how the ﬁnancial sector responds
to the demand for external ﬁnance generated by changes in the joint distribution of cash
ﬂows and investment opportunities.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the evidence and
discusses alternate explanations. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 characterizes
the equilibrium allocations. Section 4 presents the quantitative results. Section 5 concludes.
1 Evidence
This section characterizes the evolution of the U.S. ﬁnancial sector. It shows why it is
important to distinguish assets under management from value added, and it presents the
evidence on the cross-sectional distribution of cash ﬂows and capital expenditures.
Value added and compensation shares
Figure 1 displays the share of GDP and the share of employee compensation accounted for
by the Finance and Insurance industry over the post-war period. The shares are similar
and have grown together, almost linearly.3 Figure 2 shows the evolution of the shares of
various subsectors (starting in 1977 because of data limitations). The data is from the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). In NIPA, the ﬁnance industry is split into
4 categories: (i) Credit intermediation; (ii) Investment banking, venture capital, brokerage,
and portfolio management; (iii) Insurance and reinsurance; (iv) Pension funds, mutual
funds (open- and closed-end), and trusts. Figure 2 shows that credit intermediation is
the dominant activity, and, together with investment banking and brokerage, the fastest
growing. Funds and trusts account for a negligible share of value added. This brings up
two important issues: the distinction between assets and value added, and the classiﬁcation
of the various activities in a theoretical model.
3See Philippon and Resheﬀ (2007) for a detailled empirical analysis of employment and wages in the
ﬁnancial sector.
5Value added versus assets under management
Figure 3 shows the allocations of value added and assets within the ﬁnancial sector in 2005.
The data on value added is from the NIPA, as described above. The data on assets is from
the Flow of Funds Accounts. To create Figure 3, I have mapped the Flow of Funds into the
NIPA classiﬁcation. Figure 3 makes it clear that there is no simple relationship between
value added and assets under management. As a result, the common wisdom that the rise
of the pension and mutual funds industry is the main factor behind the evolution of ﬁnance
severely misses the point. In fact, from a theoretical perspective, funds and trusts resemble
the Arrow-Debreu benchmark: they control a lot of assets without using much economic
resources. I conclude that, to understand the growth of the ﬁnancial sector, one should not
focus on mutual funds, but rather on credit intermediaries, investment banks and private
equity.
Functional analysis
From a theoretical perspective, industry classiﬁcations are useful only to the extent that
they can be mapped into economic functions, as advocated by Merton (1995). To do
so, one must look at the tasks performed by employees of the ﬁnancial sector. Figure 4
presents estimates of the share of ﬁnance activity that is presumably related to corporate
ﬁnance and credit intermediation. The data is from Philippon and Resheﬀ (2007) and
the primary source is the Current Population Survey. The estimates are based on the
compensation of employees, i.e., on employment weighted by relative wages.4 The baseline
share is constructed by removing the jobs that are not related to corporate ﬁnance or to
credit intermediation. The excluded categories are: insurance specialists; traders of stocks,
bonds, commodities and other assets; personal ﬁnancial advisors; janitors, private security
and miscellaneous employees. The baseline share is one minus the compensation share of the
excluded categories. Figure 4 shows that the baseline share is relatively stable, around 75%.
This measure might overestimate corporate ﬁnance services, however, because it includes
all clerical and administrative jobs. Some of these workers keep track of loans to businesses,
but some also provide services to households. I therefore compute a second estimate that
excludes all clerks and administrative workers. This adjusted share increases over time
4Weighting is important because wages vary with occupations. For instance, traders earn more than
clerks.
6because of the decrease in clerical employment. Based on Figure 4, I will assume that
approximately 60% of ﬁnance activity is related to corporate ﬁnance, and that this share
has not declined over time.
Globalization
Globalization does not account for the growth of the U.S. ﬁnancial sector, for two reasons.
First, the U.S., unlike the U.K., is not a large exporter of ﬁnancial services. According
to IMF statistics, in 2004, the U.K. ﬁnancial services trade balance was +$37.4 billions
while the U.S. balance was -$2.3 billions: the U.S. was actually a net importer. In 2005,
the U.K. balance was +$34.9 billions, and the U.S. balance was +$1.1 billions. Second,
ﬁnancial globalization is a relatively recent phenomenon (see Obstfeld and Taylor (2002),
and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002)), while Figure 1 shows that the growth of the
ﬁnancial sector has been continuous since the end of World War II.
Investment share of low cash ﬁrms
The evidence just discussed suggests that neither the development of mutual and pension
funds, nor globalization, are enough to account for the growth of the ﬁnancial sector. In
addition, Figures 2 and 4 highlight the role of credit intermediation and corporate ﬁnance.
What is needed now is to look at the non ﬁnancial sector in order to understand how ﬁnancial
services are used. Corporate ﬁnance is fundamentally related to investment and internal
funds. Firms with low cash ﬂows and high capital expenditures must raise external ﬁnance,
a n dt h e yr e q u i r eﬁnancial services to do so. Empirically, I compute the share of investment









Iu s ea l lﬁrms in the industrial Compustat ﬁles with non missing values for income and
capital expenditures, excluding ﬁnance, insurance and real estate. In equation (1), i is
the ﬁrm identiﬁer, income is income before extraordinary items (Data #18), and capex is
capital expenditures (Data #128). To avoid issues with the timing of income and investment
— because of time-to-build or accounting rules — capexit and incomeit are the sum of capital
expenditures and income in year t−2, t−1 and t. Figure 5 displays the shares of investment
7accounted for by low cash ﬁrms, deﬁned using three diﬀerent cutoﬀ values: 0.33, 0.25 and
0.15. All three measures show strong upward trends.5
The evidence in Figure 5 is consistent with increasing demand for corporate ﬁnance
services, but it might also reﬂect improvements in ﬁnancial intermediation, i.e., a supply
shift. Evaluating the respective contributions of supply and demand is important to un-
derstand the evolution of the economy. For instance, demand and supply shocks in the
market for corporate ﬁnance are likely to have opposite implications for equilibrium credit
rationing and aggregate investment. A model is needed to understand the contributions of
supply and demand, and their connections to other characteristics of the economy, such as
the amount of outstanding corporate liabilities, and aggregate investment itself. The next
section presents a simple equilibrium model of corporate ﬁnance that can help us interpret
the evidence.
2 A simple equilibrium model
Consider an inﬁnite horizon production economy with overlapping generations of agents
who live for two periods. The economy has two sectors, industrial and ﬁnancial. The
industrial sector produces a good that can be consumed and invested. The ﬁnancial sector
produces monitoring services that are used by entrepreneurs of the industrial sector. In the
description of the model, upper case letters denote variables that follow an upward trend
because of technological progress in the industrial sector (measured by Xt). In Section 3, I
use lower case letters for the detrended variables.
2.1 Technology and preferences
Agents discount the future at rate ρ and the size of each generation is normalized to 1.A n
agent i ∈ [0,1] born at time t consumes Ci
1,t when she is young and Ci
2,t+1 when she is












5One might worry about a change in the coverage of Compustat. However, after 1975, the ratio of the
number of employees covered by Compustat to total non-farm payrolls is constant.
8Career Choice
In their ﬁrst period, agents choose a career. Let nt be the mass of agents who choose the
industrial sector. The remaining 1 − nt enter the ﬁnancial sector. I start by describing an
agent’s career within the industrial sector. Let Xt be a measure of the aggregate productivity
of the industrial sector at time t. After she enters the industrial sector, an agent receives
two shocks: α ∈ (0,∞) and ˜ θ ∈ {0,θ}. Both shocks are publicly observable. The ﬁrst
shock, α, determines the relative productivity of the agent in the ﬁrst period of her life.
An agent i ∈ [0,n t] who receives a shock αi produces αiXt units of output. Let ¯ α be the
unconditional mean of α:
¯ α ≡ E [α]. (3)
The second shock, ˜ θ, measures the investment opportunity of the agent. Investment requires
Xt units of output at time t and delivers ˜ θXt units of capital at time t +1 . Each unit of
capital is a Lucas tree: it delivers one unit of consumption good per period and depreciates
at rate δ.L e tπ be the probability of receiving an investment opportunity:
π ≡ Pr
³
˜ θ = θ
´
. (4)
The shocks α and ˜ θ are correlated. Let Fθ (.) be the cumulative distribution function of α
conditional on ˜ θ = θ,a n dl e tfθ (.) be the corresponding density function. The distribution
of α conditional on ˜ θ =0does not need to be speciﬁed explicitly.
Production and capital accumulation
Let Kt be the stock of capital (Lucas trees) at time t. Using equation (3), industrial output
is:
Yt =¯ αntXt + Kt. (5)
This functional form is discussed later, with the other assumptions of the model. Capital
accumulates over time according to:
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + θetXt, (6)
where et is the number of entrepreneurs. Given the deﬁnition of π in equation (4), we must
have:
et ∈ [0,πn t]. (7)
9Stealing and monitoring
After investing Xt u n i ta tt i m et, an entrepreneur can steal zXt units of capital at time t+1,
while the remaining θXt−zXt is lost. The parameter z ∈ [0,θ) captures the severity of the
moral hazard problem. Monitoring can be used to limit stealing. If mi
t units of monitoring





Xt. Each agent in the
industrial sector produces μ units of monitoring.
2.2 Markets
Market clearing
Let C1,t be the total consumption of the young agents, and let C2,t be the total consumption
of the old agents. Note that C1,t and C2,t are aggregate quantities and that agents within a
generation typically have diﬀerent levels of consumption. Equilibrium in the goods market
requires:
C1,t + C2,t + etXt = Kt +¯ αntXt. (8)




tdi = μ(1 − nt). (9)
The left hand side of equation (9) is the demand for monitoring services coming from all the
entrepreneurs active at time t. The right hand side is the aggregate supply of monitoring
by the 1 − nt agents who work in the ﬁnancial sector.
Asset prices
Let rt be the interest rate between period t and t+1. The ex-dividend price of one unit of





The net present value of a project is vtXt,w h e r e :
vt = θqt − 1. (11)
2.3 Discussion of the model
Levine (2005) deﬁnes ﬁve broad functions for the ﬁnancial sector: screening, monitoring,
trading, pooling of savings, and easing the exchange of goods and services. I abstract from
10transaction costs, liquidity provision, and trading frictions. For the purposes of this paper,
the distinction between screening and monitoring is inconsequential.6 One should think of
the model as including the screening, certiﬁcation, monitoring and governance functions of
the ﬁnancial sector.
Modeling ﬁnancial intermediaries as monitors follows a long tradition in economics and
ﬁnance, and much work has been done on the issue of who monitors the monitors (Diamond
(1984), Holmström and Tirole (1997)). I abstract from this issue by not introducing asym-
metric information or moral hazard between savers and ﬁnancial intermediaries. Allocations
within the ﬁnancial sector are therefore irrelevant; only productivity μ matters.
Regarding preferences, the main assumption is that agents are risk neutral. The paper
does not take into account the services provided to households, in terms of liquidity and
personal insurance. Risk neutrality also implies that the real rate of interest is equal to ρ
as long as consumption is interior for some agents.
The important assumptions for the production function in equation (5) are constant
returns to scale and labor augmenting technology. It is well known that these are needed
for balanced growth. The fact that K and n are perfect substitutes is only a simpliﬁcation
to reduce the dimension of the system and allow a simple analysis of heterogeneity among
entrepreneurs. Similarly, the assumption of exogenous technological progress is convenient
for the positive analysis presented here, but is not critical. It is conceptually straightforward
to relax these assumptions: Philippon (2007), for instance, presents a normative analysis in
an endogenous growth model with a standard Cobb-Douglas production technology.
Finally, the model assumes a closed economy. This means that the entire demand for
ﬁnancial services comes from domestic ﬁrms. Section 1 explains why this is a natural
benchmark, and Section 4 reconsiders the issue in light of the quantitative results.
3 Financial services in equilibrium
The deﬁnition of an equilibrium is standard. Agents maximize (2) by choosing a career
and a consumption path. Potential entrepreneurs choose whether to invest or not, and all
markets clear.
6A model where the ﬁnancial sector selects and certiﬁes projects has similar equilibrium implications as
the model presented here.
113.1 Balanced growth
Aggregate productivity Xt grows at rate γ: Xt+1 =( 1+γ)Xt. I use lower-case letters to
denote the quantities scaled by productivity: kt ≡ Kt/Xt, ct ≡ Ct/Xt, and so on. The scaled
quantities are constant on the balanced growth path. The interest rate is also constant.






Combining the market clearing condition (8) with the budget constraint of old agents c2 =
k +( 1− δ)qk, we obtain the investment/saving equation:
c1 =¯ αn − ϕ(r)e, (12)







I now describe the balanced growth of three economies. I quickly discuss the economy
without moral hazard, and the economy with moral hazard but without intermediation.
The model is simple enough that these cases can be understood directly by looking at
Figures 6 and 7. I then characterize the equilibrium with moral hazard and intermediation,
which is the main focus on the paper.
3.1.1 No moral hazard
Consider ﬁrst the case where z =0 . Projects are funded if and only v = θ/(r + δ) − 1 is





= π if r + δ<θ
∈ [0,π] if r + δ = θ











∈ [0, ¯ α/ϕ(ρ)] if r = ρ





The equilibrium condition es (r)=ed (r) pins down the interest rate. The following propo-
sition characterizes the equilibrium, which is also depicted on Figure 6:
12Proposition 1 Without moral hazard, entrepreneurship and investment take place if and
only if θ>ρ+δ. All projects are ﬁnanced when (1 + γ)π ≤ (δ + γ)¯ α.O t h e r w i s er = θ−δ,
and e<π .
One important feature of this economy is that the equilibrium is independent of the con-
ditional distribution of productivity Fθ (.). Only the unconditional mean ¯ α matters. From
now on, I assume that the no-moral hazard economy has a strictly positive investment rate
with an interior solution for consumption:
Assumption 1: θ>ρ+ δ and ¯ α>π ϕ(ρ).
3.1.2 Moral hazard without intermediation
Consider now the case where z>0, but μ =0 . An entrepreneur borrows b when she is
young and produces θ units of capital when she is old.7 The cum-dividend value of one unit
of capital is (1 + r)/(r + δ). If the entrepreneur defaults, she gets z (1 + r)/(r + δ).I fs h e
does not default, she gets (1 + r)θ/(r + δ)−b(1 + r). The maximum amount of borrowing
allowed is therefore bmax =( θ − z)/(r + δ). An entrepreneur with current income α can
ﬁnance her investment if and only if α+bmax > 1.T h i sd e ﬁnes a threshold αh for ﬁnancing
without monitoring:




Internal cash must cover the diﬀerence between the pledgeable value of the project and the
capital expenditures required to start the project. Entrepreneurs whose income is less that
αh are ﬁnancially constrained.
Let ec (r) be the eﬀective investment demand curve under moral hazard. When r+δ>θ ,
it collapses to zero, just like in equation (14). When r + δ ≤ θ, the constrained investment
demand is given by:
ec (r)=π
³
1 − Fθ (αh)
´
. (17)
When r + δ = θ,t h ee ﬀective demand curve is vertical and ec can be anywhere between
0 and π
¡
1 − Fθ ¡z
θ
¢¢
. The saving equation (15) is the same as in the economy without
moral hazard. The equilibrium is depicted on Figure 7 and characterized by the following
proposition:
7Recall that all these quantities are scaled by Xt.
13Proposition 2 Under assumption 1, and without monitoring, the interest rate is ρ and the
number of projects ﬁnanced is ec (ρ).
Proof. Under assumption 1, equation (12) shows that c1 > 0. Therefore r = ρ.
Investment is pinned down by the constrained demand schedule ec evaluated at r = ρ.
3.1.3 Active intermediation
Consider now the case where z>0 and μ>0. An entrepreneur with current income α
hires m units of monitoring. The pledgeable income becomes (θ − z + m)/(r + δ).T h e
amount of monitoring required for this entrepreneur to be able to invest is:
m(α)=( r + δ)(αh − α). (18)
Let φ be the price of one unit of monitoring. The NPV of a project, net of intermediation
costs, is v − mφ.I ti sp r o ﬁtable to use monitoring if α is more than αl,d e ﬁned by:
m(αl)φ ≡ v. (19)
Let us now turn to the supply of ﬁnancial services. Agents choose their careers freely,
therefore, in any equilibrium with intermediation, we must have:
μφ =¯ α + π
³





(v − φm(α))dFθ (α). (20)
The left-hand-side of equation (20) is the value of entering the ﬁnancial sector. The right-
hand-side is the value of entering the non-ﬁnancial sector, which contains three terms: the
expected income from production, the expected value of becoming an entrepreneur who
can ﬁnance herself directly, and the expected value of becoming an entrepreneur who hires

















Figure 8 describes the monitoring equilibrium.
14Proposition 3 Under assumption 1, the balanced growth path with active monitoring is
characterized by r = ρ,a n db yαl and n that solve equations (21) and (22). Credit rationing
persists as long as αl > 0,a n dt h es i z eo ft h eﬁnancial sector is strictly positive as long as
fθ (αh) > 0.
Proof. Under assumption 1, equation (12) shows that c1 > 0. Therefore r = ρ.T h e
RHS of equation (21) goes to zero as αl → αh so for any value of μ>0,i ti sp o s s i b l et o
ﬁnd αl <α h that solves equation (21). If the density fθ (αh) > 0 and if fθ is continuous,
then the RHS of (22) is strictly positive and n is strictly less than one. QED.
Some agents become ﬁnancial intermediaries even when μ is very small. The price of
monitoring φ can be arbitrary large, but entrepreneurs who are close enough to the cutoﬀ
αh are always willing to buy the small amount of monitoring required to obtain ﬁnancing.
3.2 Comparative statics
Consider ﬁrst the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial sector. How does the size of the ﬁnancial sector
depend on μ? On the one hand, an increase in μ implies that the same amount of monitoring
can be performed by fewer ﬁnanciers. On the other hand, the drop in the price of monitoring
services leads to a surge in demand. These two forces determine the eﬀects of changes in the
productivity of monitoring services. When n is close to one, the supply eﬀect is negligible
and the demand eﬀect dominates. Therefore, starting from a value of μ close to zero, an
increase in μ leads to a decrease in n. For a very large value of μ, the density fθ(αl) must
eventually be close to zero, and n must increase in response to an increase in μ.
Proposition 4 T h es i z eo ft h eﬁnancial sector goes to zero when its eﬃciency becomes
either very small or very large. Eﬃciency gains in ﬁnance reduce rationing and increase
investment, but have an ambiguous eﬀect on the GDP share of the ﬁnance industry.
Proof. See appendix.
Consider now the demand for ﬁnancial services. A change in z aﬀects the self-ﬁnancing
cutoﬀ αh. When moral hazard worsens, credit rationing increases. The size of the ﬁnancial
sector might go up or down, because fewer agents invest, but the ones who do require more
monitoring.
15The comparative statics for Fθ are unambiguous, unlike those for z. Remember that
Fθ is the distribution of α conditional on ˜ θ = θ. Thus, a change in Fθ for a given ¯ α is like
changing the cross-sectional correlation between investment opportunities and current cash
ﬂows, while keeping average productivity constant. If Fθ moves to the left, it becomes less
attractive to work in the industrial sector. The price of ﬁnancial services decreases to keep
agents indiﬀerent between careers. The demand for ﬁnancial services therefore increases
both because of the shift in Fθ and because of the drop in αl.
Proposition 5 A decrease in the correlation between current income and investment op-
tions decreases αl and increases the size of the ﬁnancial sector.
Proof. See appendix.
4 A quantitative investigation
The quantitative investigation has two parts. I calibrate the parameters of the model by
matching the characteristics of the U.S. economy at the beginning of the sample, 1956 to
1965. Then, I propose an interpretation of the evolution of the ﬁnancial sector over the
period 1966-2005. The key point of the exercise is that the model uses only data from the
non ﬁnancial corporate sector in order to predict the evolution of the ﬁnancial sector. The
data used in this section are presented in Table 1.8
4.1 Calibration
I start by choosing standard values for the discount rate and for the depreciation rate:
Variable Empirical Value Model Parameter
L e n g t ho f1P e r i o d 2 0y e a r s
Annual real rate 4% ρ =1 .0420 − 1
Annual growth rate 2% γ =1 .0220 − 1
Annual depreciation rate 6% δ =1− 0.9420
Next, I use the fact that the book value of a realized project is 1 while its market value
is θ/(ρ + δ).I o b t a i n θ by assuming a ratio of market value to book value of 1.5.9 It
8The calibration is data intensive: it relies on long time series of aggregate and ﬁrm level measures, that
are only available for the US. See Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2007) for a study of a large cross-section
of countries.
9Fama and French (2001) report an asset weighted average of 1.4 over the period 1963-1998.
16seems a priori diﬃcult to calibrate the remaining parameters of the model, since they are
not observable. Notice, however, that the equilibrium equations (21) and (22) depend only




. The unknowns are therefore: z, μ/π, ¯ α/π and αθ. I estimate the four
parameters using data on four observed quantities during the ﬁrst decade, 1956-1965.
Capital Expenditures
In the model economy, aggregate investment expenditures are equal to
¡
1 − Fθ (αl)
¢
πn,
and the stock of capital along the balanced growth path is:
k =
³




The gross domestic product is ¯ αn + k. Therefore the investment share of GDP depends
only on αl and on the ratio ¯ α/π:
1 − Fθ (αl)
¯ α/π +( 1− Fθ (αl))θ/(δ + γ)
.
I calibrate this ratio to 11% using private non-residential ﬁxed investment divided by private
value added from the National Income and Product Accounts.
Investment share of low cash ﬁrms
The parameter α captures the ratio of income to capital expenditures, for the ﬁrms that
actually invest. I use a simple statistic to compare the model and the data: the share of
total investment accounted for by ﬁrms whose income is less than one third of their capital
expenditures.10 The investment share of low cash ﬁrms is based on Equation (1) in Section
1. In the model, it is:
s =
³




1 − Fθ (αl)
´
.
Figure 5 displays the shares of investment accounted for by ﬁrms with α below 0.15, 0.25
and 0.33.
Corporate borrowing
10This statistic is useful because it does not involve taking a ratio of income over capital expenditures. It
is robust to the discrepancy between the assumptions made in the model and the fact that ﬁrm sizes are in
fact very heterogenous. It also builds in the fact that large ﬁrms are more relevant than small ﬁrms
17In the model, ﬁrms with α<α l cannot invest, and ﬁrms with α>1 can ﬁnance their
investment entirely with their current income (see Figure 7). Total corporate borrowing in




(1 − α)dFθ (α).
I compute the ratio of outstanding credit market instruments over GDP from the Flow
of Funds. This ratio is shown in Table 1. The relevant variable for the calibration is the
amount of new borrowing in each period. I assume that the average maturity of credit
market instruments is 10 years, and I calibrate the model to a borrowing ratio equal to
1/10 of the outstanding value from Table 1.
Calibration
Based on the evidence in Figure 4, I match 1− n as 0.6 times the value added share of the
ﬁnancial sector. To summarize, the calibration uses the ﬁrst line of Table 1, corresponding
to the period 1956-1965: investment at 11% of GDP, n =0 .979, s =0 .166,a n db o r r o w i n g
at 3.73% of GDP. The implied parameters are:
z/θ μ/π ¯ α/π αθ
0.7558 3.978 5.151 1.207
For robustness, I have redone the calibration assuming average maturities from 8 to 15
years for corporate bonds, and assuming that fθ is downward sloping triangular instead of
uniform. The quantitative properties of the model are similar.
An important parameter in the calibration is z. The calibration implies that moral
hazard is relatively severe, and that ﬁrms are willing to pay signiﬁcant fees in order to
improve their access to external ﬁnance. Few empirical papers provide structural estimates
of the severity of moral hazard or the costs of external ﬁnance, but two notable exceptions
are Biais, Bisière, and Décamps (2000) and Hennessy and Whited (2007). Biais, Bisière,
and Décamps (2000) estimate large agency costs using a sample of French ﬁrms in the
1990s. Hennessy and Whited (2007) ﬁnd that the typical ﬁr mb e h a v e sa si ff a c i n ge x t e r n a l
costs of equity starting at 8.3% of gross proceeds, and rising to 14.5% when proceeds reach
$100 millions. In my calibration, the average ﬁnancing fees are around 10% of capital (with
signiﬁcant heterogeneity since some ﬁrms have access to direct ﬁnance without fees, and
some other pay large fees).
184.2 Quantitative predictions
Since ﬁrms that do not have enough income to cover their capital expenditures require
intermediation, Figure 8 suggests an increase in the equilibrium level of ﬁnancial services
over time. One must keep in mind, however, that Figure 8 is based on realized capital
expenditures, not on investment opportunities. Figure 8 could be explained either by a shift
in Fθ,o rb yas h i f ti nt h ec u t o ﬀ αl for a given distribution Fθ. A quantitative model is
needed to make sense of the data.
As explained above, the model is ﬁrst calibrated using values for the period 1956-1965.
The point of this section is to use the model to predict the evolution of the ﬁnancial sector
over the next four decades, and then to compare the predictions to the actual numbers.
Predictions
I construct predicted values keeping the technological parameters (θ,π, ¯ α) and the moral
hazard parameter z constant. I let the conditional distribution of income, determined by αθ
t,
and the relative eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial sector, μt, change over time. I use the investment
to GDP ratio and the share of investment by low cash ﬁrms to pin down these two unknowns.
The macroeconomic evidence is that the investment to GDP ratio is fairly constant over
time, so I keep it at 11%. The share of investment by low cash ﬁrms is presented in Table
1. I assume that the economy is on its balanced growth path in each decade and I simulate
the evolution of the ﬁnancial sector.
It is important to emphasize that the quantitative predictions do not use any information
regarding the actual evolution of the ﬁnancial sector, or regarding the credit market. I use
the model to recover the values of αθ
t and μt, and then to predict the GDP share of ﬁnance,
and the size of the corporate credit market.
Figure 9 shows the actual and predicted size of the ﬁnancial sector. In the ﬁrst decade,
the calibration is done so that the model accounts for exactly 60% of the actual size, as
explained in the previous section. Up to the 1990s, the model seems able to predict most
of the changes in the size of the ﬁnancial sector. The model falls short in the more recent
decade. Since the model forces all the demand for ﬁnancial services to come from domestic
ﬁrms, the discrepancy could reﬂect the globalization of the ﬁnance industry. There could
also be an increase in ﬁnancial services provided to U.S. households. The pure corporate
19ﬁnance model accounts for 58% of the overall increase.
Figure 10 shows the actual and predicted ratios of corporate credit market instruments
to GDP. The calibration in the ﬁrst period uses the actual size of the credit market, but
the predictions in the next four decade do not. The model accounts well for the evolution
of the credit market. It even over-predicts its development a little.
Counter-factual experiments
The quantitative predictions just described are based on the structural parameters αθ
t and
μt that the model recovers from the data. From the ﬁrst decade to the last one, the model
estimates a drop of αθ
t from 1.2 to 0.7, and an increase in μt from 4 to 4.6. What is the
contribution of each parameter to the overall evolution of the economy?
Table 2 shows the results of counter-factual experiments using the calibrated model. The
parameters θ, π, ¯ α and z are constant. In one experiment, μ is kept constant at 4, and αθ
is moved from 1.2 to 0.7. In the other experiment, αθ is kept constant at 1.2 and μ is moved
from 4 to 4.6. Table 2 shows that most of the increase in the size of the ﬁnance industry
comes from a shift in the correlation between investment opportunities and current income.
Eﬃciency gains in ﬁnance, however, play a key role in the evolution of investment. Without
these improvements, the fraction of rationed ﬁrms would have increased substantially, and
aggregate investment would have dropped.11
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper is an attempt to analyze quantitatively the role of corporate ﬁnance in the
growth of the U.S. ﬁnancial sector over the post war period. To this end, I present new
evidence, and I build an equilibrium model of corporate ﬁnancial services. Using data from
the non ﬁnancial sector together with a calibrated version of the model, I ﬁnd that a shift
in the distribution of investment opportunities towards low cash ﬁrms has increased the
demand for ﬁnancial services over the past ﬁfty years. This demand shift accounts for a
large part of the increase in the size of the ﬁnance industry. At the same time, eﬃciency
gains in the ﬁnancial sector have limited credit rationing.
11Keep in mind that the model is non-linear, so the eﬀects are not additive: the total change is not the
sum of the two partial counter-factual changes.
20The paper uses a structural analysis of the allocation of resources to the ﬁnancial sector
in order to learn about the economy. Microeconomic studies have provided much direct
evidence on the role of ﬁnancial frictions. It is fair to say, however, that there is no consensus
regarding the quantitative importance of these frictions for the economy as a whole. The
equilibrium analysis of this paper oﬀers a diﬀerent and complementary perspective on the
issue, because it is diﬃcult to understand why an economy would spend nearly 8% of GDP
on ﬁnancial services if ﬁnancial frictions were not important.
Many important questions remain unanswered, however. First, the model leaves almost
half the ﬁnancial sector’s growth unexplained. One reason is clearly that the model does
not take into account the services oﬀered to households, but it remains to be shown that
these services can account for the gap. Second, the model cannot address the issue of the
overall eﬃciency of the allocation of human capital, even though it is a (necessary but not
suﬃcient) step in that direction.
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Comparative statics
Let ∆[.] denote the total diﬀerence of a function or a variable of interest. To prove the






















































These formula hold because the boundary terms with αl cancel out and because m(αh)=0 .
The monitoring function from equation (18) can be written as:
m(α)=z − θ +( ρ + δ)(1− α).
The total diﬀerence of this equation is:
∆[m]=∆[z] − ∆[θ] − (ρ + δ)∆[α]+∆[ρ + δ](1− α).
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4















As μ goes to zero, m(αl) also goes to zero and αl → αh. We need to evaluate the limit of
the integral. For all α ∈ [αl,α h], we know that 0 <m(α) <m (αl) and therefore:









° ° ° ° ≤ Fθ (αh) − Fθ(αl).









Using equation (22), we see that (1 − n)/n = π/μ
R αh
αl mdFθ. Since the monitoring function
m is decreasing in ¯ α, it follows that




° ° ° ° ≤ m(αl)
³
Fθ (αh) − Fθ(αl)
´
.
Since we have shown that μ/m(αl) has a ﬁnite limit, it follows that 1 − n → 0.I n t h e
other limit when μ →∞ , the result is clear from equation (22) since the integral of the
right-hand-side is bounded by
R αh
0 m(α)dFθ (α).











24So it is clear that αh decreases with μ.T h e e ﬀect on the size of the ﬁnance industry,

















The sign of the RHS clearly depends on the value of n.Q E D .
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5























Fθ (αh) − Fθ (αl)
´
∆[z]
On the one hand, it takes more resources to monitor a given set of ﬁrms. On the other
hand, the pool of ﬁrms that are monitored shrinks. Consider now a shift in the function



































25Period Finance Share of GDP





1956-1965 0.035 0.166 0.373
1966-1975 0.040 0.216 0.473
1976-1985 0.049 0.275 0.524
1986-1995 0.061 0.350 0.604
1996-2005 0.075 0.398 0.624
Table 1: Data
Notes: Finance Share of GDP is value added of the Finance and Insurance industry divided by GDP, both measured in current 
dollars. Investment share of low cash firms is the fraction of all capital expenditure in Compustat accounted for by firms whose 
income is less than a third of their capital expenditures. See also Figure 5. Credit Market Instruments are for the non financial 
corporate sector. Source: National Income and Product Accounts, Compustat, and Flow of Funds. Finance Value Added over 
GDP
Fraction of Constrained 
Firms
Starting Value (from model) 0.0210 0.1287
Final Value (from model) 0.0444 0.1287
Predicted by demand shift only 0.0382 0.2099
Predicted by efficiency gains only 0.0246 0.0825
Table 2: Counter- FactualsSource: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts



































































































































Share of GDP Share of WagesSource: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts


























Credit Inter. Insur. Trusts & Funds Inv. Bank & BrokerReading: The insurance industry accounts for 14.6% of the assets of the financial 
sector, and for 30.9% of its value added, in 2005. Source: U.S. National Income and 
Product Accounts, and Flow of Funds.








Credit Intermed. Insurance Trusts & Funds Inv. Bank. & Broker
Share of Finance GDP
Share of Finance AssetsNotes: The baseline share is computed as one minus the compensation share of insurance specialists; traders of 
stocks, bonds, commodities and other assets; personal financial advisors; janitors, private security and 
miscellaneous employees. The second measure subtracts the share of administrative workers and clerks. 
Source: Current Population Surveys, and Philippon and Resheff (2007).


























BASE-ADMINFigure 5: Investment Shares of Low Cash Firms
Notes: Sum of capital expenditures by firms whose income is less than 15%, 25% or 33% of 
their capital expenditures, divided by the sum of capital expenditures by all the firms in the 
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πFigure 8: Equilibrium With Monitoring








Density function fθ(α)Figure 9: Simulation of Calibrated Model












1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005
Actual
Predicted
Notes: The predicted share is based on corporate financial services only. It is constructed 
with the calibrated model, using the investment to GDP ratio and the cross sectional 
distribution of cash flows and capital expenditures.Figure 10: Simulation of Calibrated Model












1966-1975 1976-1985 1986-1995 1996-2005
Actual
Predicted